Italians do it better

While the critics share their toughts about tiki-taka, with some people saying that the Spanish play style of retaining the ball with short passing is boring, there is another team that deserves to take a look to. Cesare Prandelli’s Italy showed that is possible to win without a clear formation or playing style. Prandelli utilised a 3-5-2 for Italy’s two initial matches against Spain and Croatia, then he switched to a 4-3-1-2 against Ireland and England. Two years ago, in the tiki-taka Era, Josè Mourinho shocked the world showing that a side can win playing reactive football. After being outplayed when he tried a different approach, Mourinho came back to his ordinary strategy to let the opponents have the ball in the way to play fast-breaks. It was the same tactics that Chelsea utilized at the Nou Camp a few months ago and they produced in the 2012 Champions League final against Bayern. Coming back to Prandelli, he tried to give his team an indentity. Prandelli went to this tournament after studied both 4-3-3 and 4-3-1-2 formations. But the fixing scandal and bad shape of some players made him playing with a 3-5-2 pattern. He relied on counter-attacking against Spain, while played a more offensive oriented football against Ireland, Croatia and England. With both Croatia and Ireland, Italy found troubles playing this kind of football and raised questions about how they are able to succeed with attacking football. Against England, things were different: Cesare Prandelli brought in Riccardo Montolivo to play as No. 10, because of concerns over Thiago Motta and, against a reactive team like Roy Hodgson's side, Italian way produced to dominate the middle of the pitch. Prandelli's team has the tactical flexibility to switch between patterns within the match. During the match, Prandelli also brought on Alessandro Diamanti and Antonio Nocerino playing also with a 5 men-midfield. They adapt the formation to the opponents. But the key is on their philosophy: can a team be active and also reactive? Italy has done it. This is maybe the first time we have a big team relying on the opponents features with success. With English happy to let them the ball, and with no pressing there, Italy was able to built an entertaining active kind of football. Against Germany, Italy played the diamond, lining up Federico Balzaretti as right-back, a position not unsual for this player, that played this role during his stints with Torino and Juventus. Germany dominated possession, loading the centre of the pitch with four good ball carriers in Mesut Ozil, Toni Kroos, Lukas Podolski and Bastian Schweinsteiger. But Italy wanted not sacrifice "two years' work" by coming back to a more reactive approach, such as coach Cesare Prandelli said. 
Jogi Low pick Ozil to chase Andrea Pirlo. But after few minutes, Germany's head coach changed his mind and swithced the duty to cover the Italian deep-lying playmaker to Kroos. That changed the initial pattern in a 4-4-2 with Ozil lined up as right wing. This move wasn't particularly effective: with the Germany loading the middle of the pitch, Italians found spaces on the left side. Italian strategy was clear: they tried to find a free-man in the gaps between defensive and midfield's lines of Germany and to isolate Antiono Cassano in one-to-one situations on the left, where played the unimpressive Jérôme Boateng. And the first goal came from a movement of Cassano in a 1 vs 1 situation following a forward move made by left-back Giorgio Chiellini. Mario Balotelli aside, Cassano's performance was particularly brilliant. He made a lot of runs, trying to find spaces behind rivals' midfield's line and also playing the one-to-one on the flank. Prandelli’s substitutions in the second half made the team more safe defensively, when Italians showed other issues about fitness shape. 

One of the most defensive display made by the Italians was the utilization of the so called 'coperture preventive' - maybe a good English translation could be precautionary coverage - a defensive action based on send against the ball carrier the closest player in the way to stop the counter-attack and to allow to his teammates to gain time recovering their defensive positions. This is a key part of the game: how avoid transitions and how play defensive transitions. And It's a key part of Prandelli's game plan. Another good move made by Prandelly was to keep two strikers high up the pitch without big defensive duties, in the way to have two men ready for the counter-attacks. At the end, Low and Germany was tactically outcoached by Prandelli: Germans had no idea on how contain Italian forwards and how to find spaces in the middle fo the pitch. In the second half, Prandelli replaced Riccardo Montolivo and inserted Thiago Motta then brought on Alessandro Diamanti for Cassano and Antonio Di Natale for Balotelli, switching to a 4-4-1-1 formation. 
Italy was impressive defensively, especially with the midfielders, even ready to close the gaps centrally, to help the defense and to cover the pass options around Germany's ball carriers. We have seen also Daniele De Rossi playing as a true left back, in a kind of 5-men defense, against Boateng during the second part of the game...

Coach Bert van Merwijk resigned

Henk Spaan - editor of Hard Gras - said after the World Cup 2010 final that Holland destroyed a 40-year tradition of Total Football. The Netherlands have a tradition of playing attacking football, while van Marwijk’s squad played a pragmatic brend of football in 2010. So the coach was under pressure to come back to the old way. But Holland's effort to come back to his well known and prideful '70s' play style failed miserably. Total Football wasn't here. And, as you know, Bert van Marwijk has stepped down as Holland's coach. van Marwijk was fighting to retain his job after this terrible Euro Cup. KNVB confirmed him, but the coach decided to step down after his team were eliminated in the first round of the tournament following three straight defeats against Denmark, Germany and Portugal. Former Feyenoord and Borussia Dortmund coach relied on the squad which lost the World Cup 2010 to Spain but it didn't pay. He stayed with his usual starting XI, and forgot on the bench young guns such as Kevin Strootman or Ron Vlaar. The problem here was also that van Marwijk lost the dressing room: his relationships with Arjen Robben, Klaas-Jan Huntelaar, and Rafael van der Vaart, who had publicly criticised him, were bad. There was tension there, and not a positive one. On the pitch, his team was outplayed, specially in middle, where Mark van Bommel, coach's son-in-law, and Nigel de Jong were a mess. And the decision of van Marwijk to play with two holding players was highly criticized. The defense was slow and not good enough, the attackers up top never worked - mainly against Denmark when Holland didin't score despite they had over 30 shots - and a dualism was created in a nation split about  Robin van Persie or Huntelaar as Van Marwijk's pick at centre forward. Some players underperformed: van Persie scored  43 goals in 54 appearances for both Arsenal and Holland this season but, match against Germany aside, didn't find the net. The team had not a reliable left-back in Jetro Willems, 18 years-old, too young to fill the void. But the task to sub Van Marwijk will be not easy: after all, he's the man that lead the Dutch near to be World Cup champions. The questions is: who will replace him? After the disaster of World Cup 2002, should be not easy to see Louis Van Gaal in charge of Oranje once more. Ruud Gullit too lost his appeal after unimpressive stints with Feyenoord, Los Angeles Galaxy and Terek Grozny. Frank Rijkaard has previously coached Holland and reached the semi-finals at Euro 2000 so he could deserve another chance. He's the current Saudi Arabia's head coach. Former international Frank de Boer did a great job the past two seasons leading Ajax to two Eredivisie crowns but he seems determined to stay with the club. Guus Hiddink is another former Holland boss but he got a big paycheck with Anzhi Makhachkala. Two ousiders could be Gertjan Verbeek and Will Van Hanegem. Coo Adriaanse is unemployed, and he's a guy that can satisfy KNVB's demand about tactics and philosophy. Be that as it may, with Holland criticised for a lack of fitness, the first goal should be to bring on Dutch fitness trainer Raymond Verheijen.

How to cover those midfielders

How to deal with teams like Germany, where there is an attacking midfielders in front of two central, mobile, midfielders? Or with teams like Spain when they play with a player such as Xavi Hernandez, able to move up in the way to make Spanish formation switching from a 4-3-3 to a 4-2-3-1 during the game? Germany's strenght starts from the movement of Mesut Ozil, Sami Khedira and Bastian Schweinsteiger. Ozil drifts often towards the right of the field, leaving open spaces for the upcoming Schweinsteiger or Khedira. Jogi Löw moved his midfielders in the way to have one of them always covering the others. There are two different ways to react. Some teams are structured with two hlding midfielders, like Holland was. Holland lined up Nigel de Jong alongside Mark van Bommel. They had the task to follow in a near to man-to-man coverage Ozil and Co. But when the Deutsch superstar moved on the flanks, while Wesley Sneijder stayed high up, his movement left the other holding midfielders outnumbered 1 vs 2 in the middle of the pitch. That happened in the Schweinsteiger's goal: De Jong picked the first runner, Van Bommel had to chase the second runner and no one picked Schweinsteiger. 
Other teams stayed in a strict zonal marking, like England and Greece. They opted to pack that central pitch zone. Against Germany yet, the Greeks had Grigoris Makis, Kostas Katsouranis, and Giannis Maniatis covering the middle in a zonal marking way. The second Germany's goal was coming from a Khedira's run that found the German player in the right position. But two Greeks midfielders, Katsouranis and newly insterted Georgios Fotakis, those nearest to the ball, made no mistakes, covering their zones. Makis too was covering the zone near to the penalty box, taking a look to Schweinsteiger. It was Maniatis, now moved to right full-back position, that had to cover better Khedira. This kind of central coverage allows the teams to have not players drawn out of position but can leave an attacking midfielder over the midfield's line, free to exploit spaces.

Portugal too plays in a zone mode in the middle of the pitch. The trio of Joao Moutinho, Miguel Veloso, and Raul Meireles cover midfielders on their zones on the strong side, leaving free the weak side and leaving the attacking midfielders to their defenders when they break into. That changed a bit against Czech Republic, when Veloso tried to chase Czech's attacking midfielder Vladimir Darida. In that game, Portuguese midfielders tried to follow man-to-man the players on their zone with the ball on the strong side.

Cara vecchia Inghilterra

E' finita. Umiliati nel gioco, graziati nel punteggio soltanto dalla scarsa precisione degli Azzurri sotto rete. Dove sono finiti i maestri del calcio? In realtà questo titolo vale quanto un titolo nobiliare in Italia; serve per darsi prestigio, ma non è riconosciuto ufficialmente, non ha importanza pratica. Qui la questione è un'altra: dove è finita l'Inghilterra? La nazionale inglese degli anni '70 e '80 aveva un discreto tasso tecnico ed era conosciuta per la gagliardia, per l'andare in avanti sempre e comunque, anche in modo scriteriato. Per questo la FA decise nel 2001 di ingaggiare un tecnico straniero come Sven-Göran Eriksson, per dare equilibrio tattico ad una squadra talentuosa ma disordinata. Sappiamo tutti come è finita. Come un novello Attila, Eriksson è passato sui verdi campi d'Inghilterra distruggendo quanto di buono il calcio inglese aveva, senza aggiungere nulla. In pratica, via l'arrembante modo di attaccare, tipico del calcio britannico e dentro un sistema simil-catenacciaro che non ha aggiunto niente al football britannico. Eppure lo svedese doveva soltanto dare ordine tattico senza snaturare l'anima del calcio inglese. Dopo di lui, nulla è stato più come prima. Eriksson ha sprecato il talento di una generazione forse irripetibile, quella dei David Beckham, Paul Scholes, Michael Owen, del giovane David Gerrard. Via l'ex tecnico di Benfica, Roma, Fiorentina e Lazio e dentro un italiano come Fabio Capello. I risultati? Un mondiale 2010 sprecato. Lasciamo perdere le scusanti - che pur ci sono - della scarsa condizione fisica di Wayne Rooney, dei problemi in porta e del gol fantasma contro la Germania - ancora! Ma stavolta a parti invertite - Capello non ha prodotto i risultati attesi e la sua gestione ha soltanto aggravato la condizione economica dell casse della FA...allora dentro Roy Hodgson ed i risultati sono stati peggiori di prima, aleno fino a questo Europeo. Dietro la moda di una attenzione difensiva maniacale, introdotta prima da Carlos Queiroz come secondo al Manchester United, poi da Josè Mourinho e Rafa Benitez al Chelsea ed al Liverpool,  Hogdson ha costruito una delle più brutte nazionali inglesi degli ultimi 40 anni. Certamente, il livello qualitativo era anche questo il peggiore da molte stagioni a questa parte, ma possibile che con Theo Walcott, Andy Carroll e Ashley Young non fosse possibile costruire una macchina almeno decente? Va bene giocare in contropiede, ma questa tattica preved due fasi: la difesa e l'offesa. Se si difende e basta, non è più contropiede e nemmeno catenaccio...è soltanto difesa passiva. E che dire della tradizionale vigoria del calcio inglese? I ragazzi di Hodgson sono sembrati spompati, fisicamente in difficoltà contro una squadra come l'Italia che va al rallentatore o cala vistosamente dopo un'ora. A questo punto che fare? Certamente il problema dei giocatori stranieri influsice: le migliori squadre della Premier sono composte da un numero esorbitante di stranieri e con pochi giocatori inglesi eleggibili per la nazioanle. La FA deve fare qualcosa. E deve prendere in mano la situazione perché il talento inglese non vada distrutto. Accademie federali, raduni estesi nelle nazionali giovanili...ma soprattuto la Federcalcio deve dare una direzione tecnico-tattica chiara, che imponga alle nazionali di non abbandonare le proprie radici, la propria scuola, ma soltanto di  aggiungervi accortezza tattica.

England vs Italy

L'Inghilterra del nuovo corso di Roy Hogdson si schiera con un 4-4-2 piuttosto scolastico. Lo stile di gioco è tipicamente inglese - intendendo con questo termine non la classica idea di un calcio propositivo e arrembante ma poco accorto tatticamente, come poteva essere quello di nazionale e squadre britanniche negli anni '70 e '80, quanto piuttosto quello mostrato dalle più 'evolute' compagini d'oltre Manica nel nuovo millennio - basato su una difesa accorta, un centrocampo compatto che aiuta molto difensivamente e punte pronte a colpire in contropiede. La squadra non disdegna il 'Parking the Bus': con questa definizione si intende l'abilità di difendersi in due linee di difesa e centrocampo molto compatte, con 8 uomini nello spazio di 10 metri oltre la l'area di rigore. La squadra gioca secondo un sistema a zona 'puro', dove i difensori non seguono il giocatore nella loro zona se questi si muove incontro ai centrocampisti e se la palla è lontana, ma preferiscono coprire appunto la proria zona. Da vedere se il comportamento sarà lo stesso con avversari di calibro maggiore come Antonio Cassano, Mario Balotelli o Anotnio Di Natale.
Anche a centrocampo, i mediani 'basculano' scivolando con il resto dei centrocampisti e lasciando il fantasista avversario alle cure dei difensori se il giocatore in questione va oltre la linea dei centrocampisti: resta anche qui da vedere se i centrocampisti centrali si comporterebbero nello stesso modo in caso di squadra schierata con il 4-3-1-2, cioè con i difensori centrali già impegnati a controllare un avversario ciascuno. Nonostante il blocco compatto 4+4 fra linea difensiva e linea di centrocampo, ci sono momenti nei quali è possibile trovare una scarsa copertura reciproca fra i due centrocampisti centrali  da sfruttare con l'inserimento di un trequartista se Cesare Prandelli decidesse per il 4-3-1-2 o di un centrocampista se optasse per un 3-5-2. Il gioco passa dai due centrocampisti centrali: Scott Parker ha cercato 151 passaggi, mentre Steve Gerrard 149 e sono i due giocatori in cima alla lista specifica dei passaggi provati.
La squadra gioca con una linea difensiva piuttosto alta, per cercare di tenere la squadra corta. Questo accade anche in caso di palla scoperta: anche se i difensori sembrano pronti ad arretrare non appena il portatore di palla è pronto ad azionare il lancio lungo, giocatori veloci come Di Natale, Cassano e Balotelli potrebbero sfruttare questa situazione. In fase difensiva, la squadra stringe in modo tipico sul lato forte, lasciando il lato debole scoperto: questa zona potrebbe essere sfruttata da rapidi cambi di campo


In fase di transizione negativa, le due linee di difesa e centrocampo sono piuttosto abili nel ripiegamento e nel portare il raddoppio in fascia laterale: sarà quindi importante inserire interni di centrocampo in grado di aiutare gli esterni per non lasciare questi ultimi in situazione di 2 contro 1. In fase offensiva un'arma che viene utilizzata è quella dei cross: l'Inghilterra è 8° dopo la prima fase nella classifica dei cross provati con una media di 18 cross per partita. Anche la palla lunga per cercare subito gli attaccanti è un'arma tattica degli Inglesi: anche se ci sono molte squadre che ne hanno cercate di più, l'Inghilterra ne ha provate comunque 51 per partita. Nel caso in cui Hogdson dovesse schierare, dall'inizio o a partita in corso, Andy Carroll, dovranno essere presidiate le fasce laterali e coperto il pallone per evitare facili cross. In caso di palla lunga, si dovrà adottare una strategia simile a quella utilizzata da Marcello Lippi diversi anni fa contro il Chievo di Bernardo Corradi, vale a dire lasciar saltare Carroll senza ostacolarlo quando verrà a trovarsi lontano dall'area di rigore, preoccupandosi piuttosto di prendere la seconda palla. L'elemento da tenere sotto controllo sarà, oltre a Wayne Rooney, il centrocampista Steven Gerrard. Le statitische Opta ci dicono che Gerrard ha creato 7 chances e distribuito 2 assists. Gerrard è il giocatore in grado di cambiare il lato del campo sul quale viene sviluppata l'azione inglese. E' anche l'uomo dell'ultimo passaggio, avendo cercato ben 46 passaggi nell'ultimo terzo di campo, per una percentuale di realizzazione dell'80%. Ma Gerrard è anche il 4° giocatore della prima fase del torneo per precisione nei cross, con una riuscita del 47%: bisognerà quindi cercare di stare attenti quando il capitano del Liverpool deciderà di muoversi in fascia. Sui calci d'angolo difensivi sembrano un pò confusionari. Contro l'Ucraina in una occasione 5 giocatori a zona e 5 a uomo, con coperture a zona del primo palo e del centro area con Scott Parker dentro l'area piccola - angolo a rientrare -  e John Terry a zona davanti a lui. Questo contro 5 saltatori. Nella seconda occasione l'Ucraina schiera 6 saltatori e Terry ne prende uno a uomo, lasciando Daniel Welbeck nel quadrato davanti al primo palo e Parker al centro.

Inside Bento's thoughts

Although Paulo Bento stuck to a 4-4-2 during his stint with Sporting Lisbon, he learned the lesson. His Portugal became even more Morinhesque. Bento don't believe that Portugal must monopolise possession. His team is usual to adopt a contrasting approach. There’s no doubt that Josè Mourinho got his mark to contest Barcelona via a compact defence and strong fast-break. But his big deal was to convince the public that it was the right approach and that you have to don't try to dominate the match against better sides. Bento picks counter-attack over possesion. A team like Portugal has the individual quality to dominate but they got no results with this play style. So Bento wanted his Portugal to be disciplined, organised and ready to break. Despite many teams attacking mainly inside, Portugal tried to find space through the flanks, where are playing their best players, Cristiano Ronaldo and Nani. There were and are concerns about Ronaldo’s defensive performances, with opposite full-backs running over him but Bento built a 3-men midfield in which the interior midfielders are set to slide laterally in the way to cover the gaps between Ronaldo and the Portuguese full-back on his flank. Moving Joao Moutinho or Raul Meireles out wide is a Mourinho's thought.
"We have three attacking players, but I don't want them chasing fullbacks and making themselves tired. That's why I have a triangle in midfield, which slides laterally to do the defensive work. So, for example, Robben might not defend when their fullback comes forward with the ball. That's OK, because Lampard will go across and challenge him and the other two midfielders will cover for him." (Josè Mourinho)
 That allows the forwards to not expend much energy defending. But leave gaps on the middle if the rivals are able to move quickly the ball from the outside to the inside and to avoid the cover coming from the other central midfielders. The most important thing in Bento's eyes is Portugal's defensive shape. If you can control possession or position, but can't do both, Portugal's head coach stayed with position control.
"We didn’t want the ball because when Barcelona press and win the ball back, we lose our position – I never want to lose position on the pitch so I didn’t want us to have the ball, we gave it away. I told my players that we could let the ball help us win and that we had to be compact, closing spaces.” (Josè Mourinho) 
In fact, Portugal had 43% of ball possesion against Germany, 40% against Denmark and 38% latest Group match. On defensive side, Bent did not load Ronaldo with special defensive duties. On this phase, Portugal switches from the 4-3-3 to a 4-4-2 formation.
He didn't track his full-back and the benefit is that Portugal has two players up top during the fast-breaks. Even if every goal Portugal have conceded has come from Ronaldo's flank that's happened because Fabio Coentrão don't have specific defensive abilities and the interior midfielders on the Ronaldo's side wasn't able to cover laterally helping Madrid's full-back. On the other side, Portugese full-backs rarely went forward to help the attack: the work to help the attacking trio is allowed to the box-to-box midfielders in the middle. Things was different against Czech Republic. With the need to attack against a reactive team, Bento sent his full-backs forward: so Fábio Coentrão played 43 passes and João Pereira 40. In this case, they utilized a classic movement of the wings coming inside leaving free spaces on the flanks for the overlapping full-backs.
 About the way to control opponents' attacking midfielders Portugal played in a zone mode in the middle of the pitch. That changed a bit against Czech Republic, when Veloso tried to chase Czech's attacking midfielder Vladimir Darida with the Portuguese midfielders trying to follow man-to-man the players on their zone with the ball on the strong side. When the rival's attacking midfielders has the ball on a flank, one of Portugal's central midfielders chase him, leaving the other two covering the spaces in front of the back four. On the corner-kicks, they utilize a zonal-marking coverage. They have a man covering the first post; another covering the zone in front of the first post; a 5-men line covering the goalkeepers' area; 3-men in a zonal coverage inside the pelaty box. That was against a corner coming from the left with a right-footed player sending the ball inside. No one of their central midfielders is a true playmaker but all play simple passes. As said earlier, while this EURO Cup was played mainly in the middle of the pitch, the overall Portugal's strategy is to rely on the flanks. Despite his tactics was often criticised, Bento has defended the playing style of his team: that's the way he utilized to get out results.




















  

Italy vs Ireland

Heading into its Group stage crucial match, the question for Italy was: how do you solve the goal scoring issue? Against Ireland, Cesare Prandelli confused the folks from the starting lineup. He made various changes, using a 4-3-1-2 pattern with Thiago Motta as attacking midfielder behind the striker duo of Antonio Di Natale and Antonio Cassano, while Daniele De Rossi was back as interior midfielder alongside Andrea Prilo e Claudio Marchisio. The change from a 3-men back line to a 4-men defense created some initial unbalances as Ireland had a scoring chance just few seconds after the game start.  Italy have been slow and found problems to gain the gaps between Ireland's defensive and midfield's lines.

Thiago Motta sat too deeper to play the attacking midfielder role. That's why Prandelli asked Marchisio to help Motta in that zones, sharing the No. 10 duties between them. The Azzurri created few scoring chances and it would have been a very different game hadn't Cassano and Balotelli scored on set-pieces. Italy relied few on Federico Balzaretti. Sometimes it was Cassano to come back and play in this dangerous - for a 4-4-2 formation - zone. But his movement wasn't follow by cutting inside runs made by the midfielders, specially when Cassano moved outside, on his usual movement, leaving free spaces in the middle. In the second half Italy had the opportunity to play on fast-breaks but they was unable to exploit those situations. During both halfs they was unable to shift quikly from defense to attack: the transitions game wasn't here. Once again, Italy had a great performance by De Rossi. But the team were particularly unimpressive and concerns about fitness shape proved founded as Italians went down after one hour of the game. Italy didn't show yet they can succeed with attacking football. The scores was coming from set plays. The good news is that Italy gained two full-backs as Balzaretti and Ignazio Abate that dominated the line. Specially Barlzaretti was good traking up and down the left side.